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PRIVATE STANDARDS, PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE: A NEW LOOK AT THE
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD
William W. Bratton*
Abstract: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) presents a puzzle: How has this private standard setter managed simultaneously (1) to remain independent, (2) to achieve institutional stability and
legitimacy, and (3) to operate in a politicized context in the teeth of opposition from its own constituents? This Article looks to governance design to account for this institutional success. The FASB’s founders made a
strategic choice to create a regulatory agency that sought independence
rather than political responsiveness. The FASB also set out a coherent
theory of accounting, the “Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct
its decisions. The Conceptual Framework contributed to the FASB’s institutional success by disavowing a neutral posture, explicitly privileging the
interests of the users of ªnancial reports (investors and market intermediaries) over the interests of the reports’ preparers (large audit ªrms and
their managers). Nonetheless, the FASB remains vulnerable to the allegation that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit ªrms’ interest
in lowering the risk of liability while sacriªcing the users’ interest in
“fairly” stated ªnancials. This Article endorses the rejoinder position.
What some see as capture also can be characterized as “responsiveness,”
and the FASB serves a public interest in taking seriously the accounting
ªrms’ need for auditable standards. Although detailed rules can distort
the overall story told by a report’s bottom line, they also make it easier to
see what preparers are doing, easing veriªcation and making audit failures and scandals less likely. The FASB emerges as a generator of suboptimal but institutionally defensible standards.

Introduction
Legal theory has long taught that a clear line divides neither public from private law nor the public from the private sector. The legal
*
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Larry Cunningham, Michael Froomkin, Don Langevoort, Frank Partnoy, and Sid Shapiro for their comments on earlier drafts.
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realists showed that private law’s most private precincts depend on
public coercive power and so are not private at all.1 Public choice theory made the converse showing—that public law may be viewed as a
product of private incentives.2 Recent “new governance” theory draws
from both of these views to question the tight conceptual connection
usually maintained among regulatory authority, hierarchical government, and public accountability.3 It commends a more relaxed approach, both reminding us that private actors, properly incented and
deployed, can regulate successfully,4 and asking us to think of governance as a cooperative undertaking among public and private actors
jointly confronting problems needing solutions.5
Standard setting in particular can involve such public-private
regulatory cooperation. Government agencies often adopt privately
generated product standards and industrial codes to take advantage
of inexpensive, private expertise.6 But such arrangements can trigger
legitimate objections grounded in public values.7 Standard setters are
accused of being secretive, industry dominated, and unrepresentative
of all interested parties.8
All of these complaints and many more have been leveled at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”), the private setter
of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) imposes on public
1 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 589 (1933)
(contending that contract law, although viewed as “private” in nature, performs essential
public functions, such as standardizing conduct); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (arguing that government
must inevitably interfere with economic matters).
2 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 247–73 (1989) (describing government
output on the assumption that government actors are selªsh utility maximizers).
3 For overviews of this “new governance” approach, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 474–76 (2004) (stressing experimentation and negotiation);
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 344–45, 405 (2004) (stressing reºexivity and soft law).
For an intervention from the “new” school concerning securities regulation, see Christie L.
Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 757, 819–28
(2005) (arguing that new governance “inºected” approaches can improve the inherited
deterrence-based securities law regime).
4 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate 54–56 (1992) (describing a tripartite regulatory enforcement strategy that employs private interest groups as monitors).
5 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 548 (2000).
6 Id. at 640, 642.
7 See id. at 641–42.
8 See id.
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reporting companies.9 The FASB presents itself as an independent, expert, and neutral body whose standards seek only to make transparent
the economic reality of reporting companies. Yet, since its founding in
1973, it has been repeatedly criticized for an excessively private coloration, whether due to capture by managers and reporting ªrms or, alternatively, by the large audit ªrms.10 Others allege the opposite, charging the FASB with insensitivity to private interests and excessive independence.11 Some accuse the FASB of promulgating too many
standards, others not enough.12 Some complain that GAAP reports
have become too complex due to overly speciªc, rule-based formulations.13 Others complain that the standards provide insufªcient guidance.14 For some the FASB is too slow and for others it changes things
too quickly.15
The complaints are unsurprising.16 When the FASB sets a new
standard, it intervenes in high-stakes territory.17 Accounting rules implicate the conºicting interests of the ªrms and managers who prepare ªnancial statements (the “preparers”) and the investors and
9 The SEC is required to establish accounting requirements for public companies under
§ 19 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The agency determined that it would rely on a private sector standard setter in 1938. See Administrative
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4, [1937–1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,005, at 72,005 (Apr. 25, 1938). When the FASB
emerged in 1973, the SEC duly accorded it authoritative status as the generator of GAAP. See
Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and
Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973). Following
a directive of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC restated its formal recognition of the FASB as
an authoritative standard setter in 2003. See Commission Statement of Policy Reafªrming the
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No.
8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003).
10 See, e.g., Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting & Mgmt., S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, Staff Report: The Accounting Establishment 1–2 (1976) [hereinafter The Accounting Establishment] (alleging that the FASB dominates the Big Eight public accounting ªrms and their clients); Donald J. Kirk, Business and the FASB: The Need for Effective Interaction, Mgmt. Acct., Sept. 1978, at 17, 17 (noting that public sector regulators and agencies
have suggested that the FASB may not be capable of operating in the public interest).
11 See Dennis K. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be Judged?, Acct. Horizons, June
1995, at 56, 60.
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Robert Van Riper, Setting Standards for Financial Reporting: FASB and
the Struggle for Control of a Critical Process 10 (1994) (describing predictions
made at the FASB’s inauguration).
17 See Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein & J. Edward Katz, Accounting Standards-Setting in
the U.S.: An Analysis of Power and Social Exchange, 10 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 71 (1991).
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other ªnancial market actors who rely on the statements (the “users”).18 A different accounting rule can lead to different resource allocations,19 as it impacts, inter alia, stock prices, investment decisions,
and executive compensation.20 And despite the FASB’s stated objective to reveal hard economic truth about preparer ªrms, no hard science of ªnancial reporting exists to import deªnitive justiªcation to a
given standard.21 Accounting standards are conventions22 and ªnancial truth is subject to interpretative shading.23 The standard setter, no
matter how well informed, makes a judgment call.24
The charges of capture seem plausible at ªrst. Public accountants
ªll three of the present FASB’s seven seats and corporate executives
occupy two more.25 With a ªve-to-two advantage, nothing prevents the
auditors and the corporate audit clients from acting concertedly when
their interests are aligned.26 But the appearance of capture proves
deceiving. Neither the coalition hypothesized nor any remotely resembling it has ever emerged on the FASB.27 Observers have intensely
studied the FASB, but have failed to uncover signs of outside inºuence.28 Although capture has been attempted, the FASB has retained
its independence, steadily strengthening its institutional position over
time.29 As it has done so, however, it has not silenced its critics.30
There emerges a puzzle for those interested in the design of private governance institutions: How can a private standard setter simultaneously maintain its independence and achieve institutional stability
while operating in a politicized context, in the teeth of opposition
from its own constituents?

18 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 3–4.
19 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 71.
20 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 1–2.
21 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61.
22 Id. at 57.
23 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 1–2.
24 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
25 See David R. Herwitz & Matthew J. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers: Materials 154 (3d ed. 2002).
26 See id. at 154, 156.
27 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 60.
28 See id.
29 See Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and the
Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 579, 586 (1994); George
Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 813, 817 (2003).
30 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61.
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This Article looks to “old” governance design concepts to account for this private agency’s institutional success.31 The FASB’s
founders made a strategic choice between the two leading models of a
public regulatory agency: the classical New Deal model of an independent expert and the post-war pluralist model of a politically responsive regulator. They took the New Deal route, structuring the
FASB to emphasize independence. Because the New Deal model calls
for a normative goal to channel the agency’s exercise of discretion,32
the FASB undertook to set out a coherent theory of accounting, the
“Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct its decisions and
thereby to import legitimacy.33 It did not achieve the stated goal, however: the Conceptual Framework neither determined nor justiªed the
FASB’s subsequent decisions.34 As a result, the FASB never realized
the ideal in which agency legitimacy follows ineluctably from the
combination of independence and expertise.35 But the Conceptual
Framework nonetheless contributed to the FASB’s institutional success by disavowing a neutral posture towards its constituents’ conºicting interests and explicitly privileging the user interest over the preparer interest.36 The FASB has consistently adhered to this repudiation
of pluralist responsiveness, whatever its public professions of neutrality. Three results have followed. First, the FASB’s general approach
has been defensible as a matter of economic theory. Second, the
FASB has faced political opposition from the preparers.37 Although
this led to occasional political reversals, it also muted allegations of
capture. Third, the preference for users aligned the FASB’s institutional mission with that of the SEC, its public overseer, importing institutional stability if not political invulnerability.38 If not ideally legitimate, the FASB has been legitimate enough.

31 For an important discussion of points of friction arising from the FASB’s fulªllment
of a public function as a private organization, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking, and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich.
L. Rev. 291 (2005).
32 See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 39, 50–51 (1938).
33 See Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, Acct. Horizons, Mar.
2003, at 61, 62–63.
34 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 830–39.
35 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61.
36 See Objectives of Fin. Reporting by Bus. Enter., Statement of Fin. Accounting
Concepts No. 1, § 34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978) [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. 1],
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf.
37 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 75–76, 118–22.
38 See id. at 141.
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The FASB remains vulnerable to a secondary capture allegation.
Critics charge that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit
ªrms’ interest in lowering the risk of liability while sacriªcing the users’ interest in “fairly” stated ªnancials.39 They contend that “principles-based” standards would be better.40 The critics have a point. But
this Article endorses the rejoinder position. What some see as capture
also can be characterized as “responsiveness.” The FASB serves a public interest in taking seriously the accounting ªrms’ need for auditable standards. Even as detailed rules can distort the overall story told
by a report’s bottom line, they make it easier to see what preparers are
doing, easing veriªcation and making audit failures and scandals less
likely. In this post-Enron era, scandal prevention arguably takes a legitimate place with transparency as a public-regarding goal for the
GAAP setter.
The FASB emerges as a generator of suboptimal but institutionally defensible standards. Part I describes the FASB’s founding and
subsequent history as an effort to stay legitimate while simultaneously
maintaining independence and avoiding pluralist subordination to
constituent interests.41 As means to these ends, the FASB’s organizers
have drawn liberally on “public” devices in the tool box of administrative process. This ongoing process, which recently climaxed with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),42 has over time embedded the
FASB in the regulatory framework of American business. Part II shows
the connection between the FASB’s adherence to the New Deal model
of the independent, expert agency and the Conceptual Framework’s
declaration of a goal, “decision usefulness,” favoring the user over the
preparer interest.43 Part III turns to the standards themselves, taking
up the rules-versus-principles debate and the subsidiary capture question.44
I. Formation, Process, and Structure
This Part explains the FASB’s founding and organization as an
exercise in agency design under the classical expertise model.45 The
39 See The Lessons from Enron, Economist, Feb. 9, 2002, at 9, 9–10.
40 Id.
41 See infra notes 45–212 and accompanying text.
42 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codiªed in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
43 See infra notes 213–318 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 319–442 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 49–212 and accompanying text.
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model teaches that it does not sufªce to delegate standard-setting authority to competent experts and then leave oversight to the legislative principal and the public. The resulting zone of discretion under
such circumstances will be unsatisfactorily wide, particularly if any
question arises respecting the standard setter’s independence. Such
was the problem with accounting standard setters that preceded the
FASB. The FASB’s founders accordingly attempted to separate the
standard setter from the preparers, the users, and the accounting profession. According to the classical theory, however, such a separation
still will not sufªce to import legitimacy. The independent agent’s expertise will contain its discretion only if the agency pursues an ascertainable goal. The original FASB sought to put itself inside the model
by articulating a Conceptual Framework for accounting.
Many found the design intrinsically inªrm, however. From a public choice point of view, independence and expertise prevent neither
empire building by the agency nor capture by the regulated interest.
From a public interest point of view, the classical model leads to insensitivity to public demands and so cannot legitimately be employed
with private actors. The FASB, sticking to the classical playbook, survived attacks from both points of view. But it also reformed itself over
time, taking on more and more of the procedural earmarks of a public institution. Section A describes the FASB’s founding and design.46
Section B describes the criticisms leveled against it.47 Section C describes its subsequent organizational evolution.48
A. Foundation and Design
1. Antecedents and Founding
Institutionalized standard setting came to accounting in the wake
of the enactment of the federal securities laws,49 which directed the
SEC to prescribe the form and content of ªnancial statements.50 The
SEC went back and forth on what to do about the matter for several
46 See infra notes 49–130 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 131–164 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 165–208 and accompanying text.
49 Previous initiatives had been small scale and applied only to selected industries, and
so left conºicts unresolved. Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 72; see also Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Uniform Accounting 5 (1917).
50 See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. For a review of the
legislative history, see Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 798–820 (2004).
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years,51 ªnally determining in 1938 to delegate the job of providing
“substantial authoritative support” for accounting treatments to the
accountants’ professional organization, the American Institute of Accountants (the “AIA”) (later the American Institute of Certiªed Public Accountants (the “AICPA”)).52 The AIA responded in haste, creating the Committee on Accounting Procedure (the “CAP”).53 This
committee was made up of twenty-one part-time, geographically dispersed members, most of whom were certiªed public accountants
(“CPAs”).54 The committee also included a few academics,55 as well as
a two-member staff.56 The AIA assigned the CAP a limited mission: to
recommend acceptable standards by drawing from the wider menu of
prevailing practices, rather than to set new standards.57 Preparers
were not compelled to adopt them and the CAP was ºexible about
available alternatives.58 The CAP’s constituents, however, disliked this
ad hoc approach, demanding more uniformity and speciªcity.59
In 1959 the AICPA dissolved the CAP and substituted a new
committee, the Accounting Principles Board (the “APB”), which survived until 1973.60 The APB’s twenty-one part-time members included
preparers and users in addition to CPAs and academics.61 It also had a
research staff.62 But the APB satisªed neither the preparers nor the
audit profession.63 Those were Wall Street’s “go-go” years, and the
ºow of new accounting issues outstripped the APB’s capacity.64 Revenue recognition problems, off-balance-sheet leases, and the new investment tax credit all triggered controversy.65 Worse, the APB was

51 See Robert Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control? 111–32 (1975).
52 See Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-Sector Approach to the Regulation of Financial Reporting, Acct. Horizons, Mar. 1995, at 52, 55.
53 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7. For a history of the CAP, see Chatov, supra note
51, at 133–52.
54 Zeff, supra note 52, at 55–56. Note that Chatov states that there were eighteen members on the committee. Chatov, supra note 51, at 196.
55 Zeff, supra note 52, at 55–56.
56 Chatov, supra note 51, at 134.
57 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7.
58 Chatov, supra note 51, at 134; King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 584.
59 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7; King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 582–83.
60 For a history, see Chatov, supra note 51, at 195–233.
61 Zeff, supra note 52, at 56.
62 Chatov, supra note 51, at 196.
63 See id. at 197–99; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 8.
64 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7.
65 Id. at 57–59.
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seen as dominated by large accounting ªrms.66 To some, this implied
preparer capture, as the CPAs yielded to pressures from their clients.67 But the preparers did not get all the treatments they wanted; in
fact, they complained of underrepresentation.68 The APB also was
charged with developing a fundamental accounting theory—a conceptual framework to guide its standard setting.69 But it made little
progress there as well.70 Indeed, the project came to an end when its
staff produced its ªrst Accounting Research Study recommending
radical departures from cost accounting.71 The APB itself rejected the
initiative.72 In the end, the APB’s failure to promulgate a timely standard to govern mergers exhausted the patience of the large accounting
ªrms.73
In 1971, the AICPA convened a conference of auditors, preparers, and users that appointed two study groups to consider what to do
next.74 A follow-up conference considered and endorsed the study
groups’ recommendation that the standard setter remain private, so
as best to draw on private sector expertise and avoid susceptibility to
political pressure.75 But, on this third try, the conference participants
decided that the standard setter’s structure should not only guarantee
independence, but also assure better constituent representation.76
Thus did the FASB emerge in 1973 out of a series of private negotiations among representatives of its various constituents.77 The SEC
quickly accorded it authoritative status.78
2. Design
Independence meant formal separation from constituent groups,
so the primary structural change occurred at the top.79 The standard
setter was pulled from the AICPA and reorganized under the Financial
66 Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 73.
67 See id.
68 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 8.
69 See id. at 7.
70 See id.
71 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 583.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9.
76 Id.
77 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 76.
78 See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards, supra note 9.
79 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9.
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Accounting Foundation (the “FAF”), an independent not-for-proªt entity.80 The FAF’s nine trustees were to come from ªve sponsoring organizations, representing CPAs, preparers, users, and academics.81 But
the accounting profession did not cede a position of primary inºuence—the AICPA had a majority of ªve seats.82 The FAF’s (and thus the
FASB’s) funding came from contributions from the participating professional organizations, the large accounting ªrms, and preparers.83
A board comprised of seven full-time members appointed by the
FAF trustees replaced the part-time, dispersed, and dysfunctional APB
board of twenty-one.84 This new structure enabled the board to act
more quickly. The seven members were to sever their connections
with their employers, divest their investments, and go on salary for
ªve-year terms (with possible reappointment).85 Four of the seven
members were required to be CPAs; the others were to be “well versed
in problems of ªnancial reporting.”86 Voting was to proceed on a ªveto-two supermajority basis.87 Rules of Procedure, ever since referred
to as the FASB’s “due process,” were to be adopted and followed.88
Independence also meant distance from constituents and politicians,
so Connecticut was chosen as the venue over New York or Washington.89 Finally, for the founders, independence also implied secrecy.90
The original FASB met in private prior to the publication of a new
standard’s Exposure Draft.91 Member dissents were not published.92
Constituent responsiveness was addressed, if not assured, through
the establishment of an advisory body, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (the “FASAC”), appointed by the FAF and
80 See id.
81 Id. at 14. The sponsoring organizations were the AICPA, the American Accounting
Association (educators), the Financial Analysts Federation (now the Association for Investment Management and Research), the Financial Executives Institute, and the National
Association of Accountants. Id. The Securities Industry Association joined a few years later.
Id.
82 Id. Three of the remaining seats were to come from the preparers and users; one
was to be an academic. Chatov, supra note 51, at 5.
83 See Nanette Hagood & Ray G. Stephens, A Guide to Standard Setting Bodies, Ohio CPA
J., Aug. 1995, at 44, 44.
84 See Chatov, supra note 51, at 233; Zeff, supra note 52, at 56.
85 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17.
86 Chatov, supra note 51, at 5.
87 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 87.
88 Id. at 18.
89 Id. at 13.
90 See id. at 18.
91 Id.
92 King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 586.
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overseen by the chair of the FASB.93 The FASAC would contain
twenty-seven members representative of the constituent groups and
possessing skills valuable to the FASB;94 the SEC’s Chief Accountant
also was to be a member.95 It was to consult with the FASB on policy
issues and technical matters, so as to help it prioritize, set agenda
items, and keep things moving.96 Although it has always been relegated to an advisory role, the FASAC has fulªlled these duties and
never hesitated to criticize the Board.97
The FASB’s founders, then, wanted the new standard setter to be
independent yet responsive to constituent interests.98 In addition,
they wanted the FASB to remain insulated from political pressure.99
But they left one problem unresolved. As they saw it, the new agency
had no substantive mandate on which to draw in drafting standards.100 The constituents needed to come to a basic agreement, if
not on the terms of particular standards, then at a more general level
on the substantive mission of the enterprise.101 The founders left this
constitutional task to the agency itself.102 The early FASB responded
with the Conceptual Framework, a series of statements intended to
provide a uniªed theoretical basis from which to articulate standards,
stressing ªnancial statement reliability, comparability, and relevance
to users.103
93 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17.
94 Id. In 1975, the FASAC was comprised of six members from large audit ªrms, ªve
from corporations, eight from the ªnancial sector, three academics, two lawyers, two from
government, and a former SEC chief accountant. Chatov, supra note 51, at 5.
95 Chatov, supra note 51, at 5.
96 Id. at 234.
97 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17; Hagood & Stephens, supra note 83, at 44; King &
Waymire, supra note 29, at 597.
98 See Chatov, supra note 51, at 232–39; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9, 17.
99 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9.
100 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 The FASB’s original deliberations led to six statements. See generally Elements of
Fin. Statements—A Replacement of FASB Concepts Statement No. 3 (Incorporating an Amendment of FASB Concepts Statement No. 2), Statement of Fin. Accounting
Concepts No. 6 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/con6.pdf; Recognition and Measurement in Fin. Statements of Bus. Enters.,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1984), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con5.pdf; Objectives of Fin. Reporting by Nonbusiness Orgs., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
1980), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con4.pdf; Elements of Fin. Statements of
Bus. Enters., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1980), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con3.pdf; Qualitative Characteristics

16

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:5

3. The FASB and Agency Theory
The structural succession of the CAP to the APB to the FASB reºects the twentieth-century evolution of thinking about administrative
agency design. Originally, agency discretion was not seen as problematic.104 In Richard Stewart’s phrase, agencies were conceived as “transmission belts” that implemented legislative directives.105 All one needed
was an expert acting within his or her zone of competence and appropriate results would follow, with legislative oversight, bureaucratic structure, and popular opinion sufªcing to assure compliance with legislative directives.106 For instance, both the CAP and the APB operated on
the assumption that standard-setting problems could be addressed
adequately simply by applying professional expertise.107
But more was needed to justify the delegation of rule-making discretion to agencies. Thus did the New Dealers restate the theory of
the administrative agency to stress the interplay between the legislative mandate and the agency’s expertise.108 If the agency’s goal was
stated explicitly, the regulator’s expertise solved the discretion problem.109 Agency rule making became a trial and error process of applying neutral, expert knowledge to realize the stated goal.110 The rules
emerged as a function of the expertise and the state of the world,
supported by objective bases.111 Thus generated, they could not be
arbitrary. With the Conceptual Framework project inherited from the
APB, the FASB drew on this approach, seeking to justify its independent exercise of discretion by articulating generally accepted goals that
would determine speciªc accounting standards.112

of Accounting Info., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1980) [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. 2], available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/con2.pdf; FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36. The FASB also issued one later statement.
Using Cash Flow Info. and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, Statement
of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter
FASB, SFAC No. 7], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con7.pdf.
104 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, 1675 (1975).
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
108 See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1672–73, 1678.
109 See Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51, 98–99.
110 See id.; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1678.
111 See Landis, supra note 32, at 98–99; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1678.
112 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 585–86.
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The post-war critique of the New Deal expertise model also inºuenced the structure of the FASB.113 Practical experience led to questions about the agency experts’ independence.114 Critics charged that
the experts unduly favored the interests of regulated parties—the
same allegation of capture that had impaired the APB’s credibility.115
The FASB’s founders sought to cure this problem through formal
separation from the accounting profession.116 The FASB’s due process
regime similarly mirrored the standard public law palliative for capture problems—containment of agency discretion through process
rules.117 Agencies also had come to be seen as prone toward overregulation, ever more elaborating their systems of controls.118 The FASB
therefore established a built-in advisory board that was assigned the
job of overseeing its agenda.119
The FASB’s founders drew the line when it came to a more fundamental objection to agency authority. The expertise model only
works if there is a general consensus on the stated goal.120 Its critics
destabilized that assumption by questioning the very existence of an
objective public interest available to channel and contain agency discretion.121 Under this pluralist view, agency rule making becomes a
legislative and political process of balancing conºicting constituent
interests in light of a legislative directive.122 It follows that legitimacy
under this view depends on the agency’s political responsiveness—the
governance structure must afford interest groups a forum and assure
consideration of their views.123 And the more responsive the agency,
the less serious the capture problem.124 Agency design becomes a matter of mediating tensions under this view because the pluralist approach, carried to its logical conclusion, negates the independence
113 See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1684.
114 Id. at 1682.
115 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 8; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1684.
116 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 14.
117 See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1698–99.
118 See id. at 1685.
119 See Chatov, supra note 51, at 234. The FASB did not inherit a third agency problem, limited resources, which could lead to an excessive reliance on the resources of regulated interests. See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1686. Rather, the FASB owed its existence to
the SEC’s decision not to devote its own resources to setting accounting standards. See
Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, supra note 9, at 72,005.
120 Stewart, supra note 104, at 1702; see Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51.
121 See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1683.
122 Id.
123 Freeman, supra note 5, at 559–60.
124 Id. at 560.
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model.125 The agency, albeit expert, merely functions as an aggregator
of outside preferences.126 This makes private standard setting particularly problematic, for such a political process arguably should be conducted in the public sector.127
If the FASB’s founders perceived this problem they did not admit
it, because admission would have implied the abandonment of the
enterprise and the remission of the standard-setting function to the
SEC. The FASB’s existence stemmed from its private constituents’ desire to avoid the political and ªnancial risks attending such a surrender of control.128 So averse were they to a public outcome that they
proved willing not only to vest agenda control in a nominally independent board, but also to pay for its expenses.
The FASB’s founders, then, implicitly denied the pertinence of
the pluralist critique, instead insisting on the New Deal expertise
model’s suitability and designing a board that would be responsive as
a matter of process. The FASB founders felt no duty to balance constituent demands, which made the Conceptual Framework project’s
successful completion all the more important. With the Framework
up and running in a context of general consensus, the FASB would
perfectly embody the expertise model.129 It would be a legitimate neutral actor rather than a political actor in an interest group game.130
Things would not work out as projected, however.
B. Public and Private Reproaches
The FASB, charged with making the New Deal model work in a
private standard-setting context, undertook its task at an unpropitious
time.131 The Wall Street “go-go” years ended abruptly in 1973, and
were followed by a spate of scandals.132 Shortcomings in accounting
standards received some of the blame for these scandals, which put
accounting on the Congressional reform agenda.133 At the same time,
the New Deal agency model was being intensely criticized from oppo-

125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
129 See Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51; Mundstock, supra note 29, at 818.
130 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 818.
131 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7.
132 Id. at 7–8.
133 Beresford, supra note 11, at 58.
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site sides in public policy debates.134 Progressives wanted more public
responsiveness, while public choice commentators dismissed the whole
agency project as a means to the end of private rent seeking.135 The
FASB faced both attacks as it went forward under the banners of relevance, reliability, and informational neutrality.136
1. Public Interest
The founders’ project of cabining the FASB in the New Deal
model did not lack irony. In the eyes of progressive critics, the whole
enterprise resulted from a typical agency malfunction by a leading
exemplar of the New Deal legacy—the SEC.137 The critics made a
powerful case. It was clear to everybody that choices of accounting
principles had signiªcant allocative consequences, whatever the accounting profession’s position as to whether GAAP followed from objective determinants and led to objective truths.138 Neutral and transparent accounting principles did not exist.139 A political characterization of the enterprise followed: accounting standard setting was a
high-stakes game in which the setter had no alternative but to balance
interests.140 And, to the extent the standard setter resolved political
rather than technical issues,141 its legitimacy depended on political
responsiveness.142 It followed that independence was not a virtue, but
a guarantee of irrelevance, isolation, and unaccountability.143 The
public interest was at stake and a responsible public body had never
even made a considered decision on the matter.144 The time had
come to vest standard-setting authority in an agency directly responsible to Congress.145
Nor, in any event, could the FASB be considered independent.146
It depended on contributions from the preparers and auditors,
134 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 18–19.
135 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 58, 60; Kirk, supra note 10, at 17.
136 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 58; Kirk, supra note 10, at 17.
137 Chatov, supra note 51, at 8.
138 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 22–23.
139 Mundstock, supra note 29, at 822.
140 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 73–74.
141 Matters of measurement were considered to be technical issues, whereas the ultimate determination of the treatment was seen as a political matter. Id.
142 Id. at 22–23.
143 Mundstock, supra note 29, at 820.
144 Chatov, supra note 51, at 7.
145 See id. at 7–8.
146 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 14.
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groups with high stakes in all of its outcomes.147 A government board
would do a better job of weighing the costs and beneªts.148
This public interest position got a public airing in Congress in
1976 when Senator Lee Metcalf’s Committee on Government Operations held hearings and issued a blistering report.149 The SEC, the
Committee said, had delegated the standard-setting function to special
interest groups, in particular the Big Eight accounting ªrms, which enjoyed disproportionate representation on the FAF and the FASB in addition to controlling funding and stafªng.150 To restore public
conªdence, the General Accounting Ofªce needed to take over the
function, the SEC having disqualiªed itself in the matter.151 Actors from
the FAF and the FASB made their ªrst trip to Washington to defend
themselves at subsequent hearings.152 Happily, things quieted down by
the time a bill ªnally reached the House ºoor.153 The bill, which never
reached a vote, would only have required the SEC to set the FASB’s
agenda, impose a timetable, and intervene with its own standards if the
FASB were slow or issued unsatisfactory standards.154
2. Public Choice
Public choice theory explains the behavior of public actors in
terms of private incentives.155 Agencies become the targets of rentseeking interest groups, the agencies themselves constituting just another interest group.156 Thus depicted, the agencies serve the demands of the groups while expanding their own operations and power
bases.157 During the FASB’s early years, public choice theorists applied
their considerable critical acumen to a new description of the evolution of accounting standards.158

147 See id.
148 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
149 See generally The Accounting Establishment, supra note 10.
150 See id. at 1–2.
151 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 45.
152 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18.
153 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 45.
154 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18.
155 See Freeman, supra note 5, at 561–62.
156 See id.
157 See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efªcient Accounting Policy, 63 Acct.
Rev. 1, 11 (1988).
158 See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting
Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 Acct. Rev. 273, 277 (1979).
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The public choice theorists’ description follows from a picture of
an unregulated economy in which managers have high-powered reputational incentives to disclose ªnancial information voluntarily.159
Given those incentives, accounting practice evolves so as to reduce
agency costs if left unregulated.160 Reporting practices vary with the
context, depending on capital structure, monitoring costs, size, dispersion, and complexity.161 In contrast, in a regulated economy, individuals compete to use the government’s coercive power to transfer
wealth to themselves, arguing that the transfer is in the public interest
to justify the results.162 Mandated accounting treatments serve just
this purpose, as vested interests compete over them using neutrally
phrased terms.163
Under this public choice reading, the standard-setting enterprise
is intrinsically inªrm so long as the standards are mandated. If there
are mandated standards, very little difference lies in the choice between a public and private agency—the FASB and the SEC both are
seen as bad entities because they operate a mandatory disclosure system. The solution lies in the mandate’s removal. At that point a private standard setter need not be a bad thing, for its existence and robustness would depend on free choices made by preparers and users.
Although this view has negative implications for the legitimacy of
the FASB, the political implications are marginal.164 The capture allegation made by the FASB’s progressive critics is echoed, but not replicated, by public choice theorists. Here, capture implies wholesale deregulation with a consequent sacriªce of uniformity, not to mention
total reliance on market correctives to align preparer incentives. The
159 See id. at 275.
160 Id. at 277.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 280–81.
163 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 158, at 280–81; see also Ross L. Watts & Jerold L.
Zimmerman, Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, 53 Acct.
Rev. 112, 118 (1978) (predicting that managers of large ªrms will seek accounting principles that understate returns in order to hide income from regulators, while small ªrms
that are focused on incentive pay will do the opposite).
164 For a similarly marginal line of attack from the private side of the public/private divide, see generally Orace Johnson, Some Implications of the United States Constitution for Accounting Institution Alternatives, 19 J. Acct. Res. (Supp.) 89 (1981) (arguing that ªnancial
reports are constitutionally protected speech). For trenchant comments, see generally
Roberta S. Karmel, Discussion of Some Implications of the United States Constitution for Accounting Institution Alternatives, 19 J. Acct. Res. (Supp.) 120 (1981), and Edmund W. Kitch, Discussion of Some Implications of the United States Constitution for Accounting Institution Alternatives, 19 J. Acct. Res. (Supp.) 123 (1981).
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FASB has faced more immediate problems in making its case for legitimacy.
C. Institutional Evolution
The FASB and the FAF have been tinkering with their process
and structure ever since the Metcalf Report slapped down the charge
of capture and posed a pluralist alternative.165 The changes have almost uniformly pushed the FASB in the direction of greater public
responsiveness.166
1. Structural Modiªcations
The process started with a FAF review in the immediate wake of
the Metcalf intervention.167 The review led to measures that further
separated the FASB from the large audit ªrms. Contributions from
any single ªrm were capped at $50,000 or one percent of the FASB
budget.168 The requirement that four of the seven board members be
CPAs also was eliminated in favor of a weaker requirement that members have knowledge of accounting, ªnance, and business.169 The supermajority voting requirement was replaced as a result.170 The ªveto-two rule followed from a desire to prevent the appearance of a
dominant CPA voting coalition.171 With the removal of the CPA majority, a simple majority rule sufªced.172 In addition, the AICPA lost its
veto over the selection of FAF trustees.173 Sole nominating power was
instead vested in a committee of representatives from the FAF’s sponsoring organizations.174 The FASAC received an independent chair
and an expanded role.175 Finally, sunshine replaced secrecy, as proceedings were opened and dissents and other records made public.176
Future plans were to be published in periodic reports.177
165 See The Accounting Establishment, supra note 10, at 1–2, 20–24; infra notes 167–
197 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 167–197 and accompanying text.
167 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 46.
168 Id. at 88.
169 Id. at 86–87.
170 Id. at 87.
171 Id.
172 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 87.
173 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 19.
174 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 86.
175 Id. at 47, 87.
176 Id. at 86.
177 Id. at 46–47.
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Thereafter, the FASB became a larger organization, mostly
funded by the proceeds of its own publications.178 More staff enhanced its ability to meet constant demands for “timely guidance”
with technical bulletins.179 In 1984, it formed a subsidiary organization to address interpretive questions arising under existing rules.180
This Emerging Issues Task Force has ªfteen seats, ten of which are
ªlled by partners from accounting ªrms.181 Preparer representatives
take three seats, and, signiªcantly, three votes sufªce to block a determination and force the matter to the FASB’s agenda.182
Preparer demands rose to the fore in the 1980s.183 They wanted
better representation on the FASB itself and got it in 1985.184 From
then on, the FASB would be comprised of three CPAs, two representatives from preparers, one user representative, and an academic.185
That same year, the AICPA ceded its ex ofªcio trustee seat on the FAF
to a preparer representative.186 In 1990, preparer complaints about
standards overload led to the reimposition of the ªve-to-two supermajority rule.187
The AICPA thereafter continued to fade from the picture,
strengthening the FASB’s independence.188 The AICPA lost its majority of FAF seats when it emerged with ªve of the sixteen trustees in
1993.189 In the wake of Enron and SOX, the AICPA also left the business of issuing authoritative accounting guidance for registered companies.190 Interestingly, in 2002, the FAF took the occasion of the external shock of scandal to change the FASB’s voting rule back to the

178 See id. at 15. This enhanced independence from constituents but created a different, more subtle public/private problem. For discussion, see Cunningham, supra note 31,
at 323–28. By 2002, the FASB earned $13.3 million from its publications as compared with
$3.9 million from contributions. Id. at 325.
179 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 107.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. The Emerging Issues Task Force (the “EITF”) was restructured in 2003 with the
addition of two FASB members to its agenda committee and a provision for FASB ratiªcation of EITF consensus positions. See Lawrence W. Smith, The FASB’s Efforts Toward Simpliªcation, FASB Rep., Feb. 28, 2005, at 2, 2.
183 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 126.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 Id. at 164.
188 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 14–15.
189 Id.
190 See Smith, supra note 182, at 2.
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four-to-three simple majority.191 In the post-Enron environment, the
need for speed once again trumped the preparers’ interest in agenda
control.192
The FASB’s ªnal and most emphatic move to the public side of the
street occurred with the enactment of SOX in 2002.193 SOX changed
the framework of federal recognition of GAAP, requiring that a recognized standard setter be wholly funded by fees levied on reporting
companies by the federal government.194 The FASB duly applied for
recognition.195 Upon the SEC’s approval of the application, the FASB
became publicly funded and ceased collecting contributions.196 Technically speaking, it is no longer beholden to its constituents.197
2. Empirical Studies
The FASB attracts a great deal of academic attention. Its transparency and shifting voting rules,198 along with the allegations that it
has been captured,199 make its proceedings an ideal subject for social
scientists armed with statistical methodologies. Studies have looked
for connections between the members’ votes and prior afªliations,
and found nothing signiªcant.200 Nor have any dominant voting coalitions of former auditors or preparers appeared,201 although some two-

191 See FASB Voting Structure Streamlined, Leader’s Edge, June 2002, at 3, 3.
192 See id.
193 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codiªed in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
194 Id. § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Supp. III 2003).
195 Cunningham, supra note 31, at 323.
196 See id. The FASB is much richer as a result. See id. at 325. In 2004, federal support fees
totaled $25.3 million and publication net revenues $13.05 million. See Fin. Accounting
Found., Annual Report 2005, at 35, 38 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/annualre
port/FAF_2005_AR.pdf.
197 Cunningham, supra note 31, at 324.
198 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 86–87.
199 See The Accounting Establishment, supra note 10, at 1–2.
200 See John C. McEnroe & Stanley C. Martens, An Analysis of the FASB’s Independence, J.
Applied Bus. Res., Winter 1996/1997, at 129, 131–32 (concluding that the FASB’s members vote independently and updating an earlier study). Interestingly, a study of the APB
yields the same result. See D. Paul Newman, Coalition Formation in the APB and the FASB:
Some Evidence on the Size Principle, 56 Acct. Rev. 897, 908 (1981).
201 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 200, at 897–98 (surveying the literature); D. Paul
Newman, An Investigation of the Distribution of Power in the APB and the FASB, 19 J. Acct. Res.
247, 261 (1981) [hereinafter Newman, Investigation of the Distribution of Power] (demonstrating that the observed inºuence of Big Eight representatives has been no greater than that
of non-Big Eight representatives).
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member voting pairs do show up in the data.202 (Here a caveat must
be noted—any coalition activity respecting selection of agenda items
is unobservable.203) The studies also have shown that the voting rules
matter: more standards get set under the 4–3 rule than under the 5–2
rule, with the supermajority signiªcantly slowing the time to promulgation.204 Finally, self-interest clearly motivates commenting companies205 and lobbying impacts the terms of the standards.206 However, the
FASB has done fairly well with respect to resisting undue inºuence by
the large accounting ªrms.207 In fact, one study has concluded that
the FASB has not been captured, at least in any empirically veriªable
sense.208

202 See Sharon M. Moody & Dale L. Flesher, Analysis of FASB Voting Patterns: Statement
Nos. 1–86, 1 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 319, 328–29 (1986) (ªnding coalition evidence in
cases where the pronouncement passes by a 4–3 vote); Frank H. Selto & Hugh D. Grove,
The Predictive Power of Voting Power Indices: FASB Voting on Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards Nos. 45–69, 21 J. Acct. Res. 619, 622 (1983) (ªnding that one two-vote coalition
persisted, but that it did not wield voting power beyond that provided by its proper share
of the votes).
203 See Newman, Investigation of the Distribution of Power, supra note 201, at 249 (noting
that a powerful Big Eight coalition block could block agenda items so that an issue
reached the agenda only with the coalition divided).
204 See William R. Pasewark, The Effect of Imposed Voting Requirements on FASB Decisions, 15
J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 75, 84 (2000) (showing that the FASB produced 3.80 pronouncements per year under supermajority provisions and 6.78 per year under a simple
majority rule). For simulations of voting patterns, see Thomas D. Fields & Ronald R. King,
Voting Rules for the FASB, 11 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 99, 111, 114 (1996) (showing that a
supermajority maintains the status quo more often given imperfect information but that
the margin of victory is unlikely to change under either requirement); R.R. King, An Experimental Investigation of Supermajority Voting Rules: Implications for the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 25 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 197, 206–15 (1994) (showing that a laboratory
experiment applying simple majority and supermajority voting rules reached inconclusive
results).
205 See Michael Ettredge et al., Competitive Harm and Companies’ Positions on SFAS No.
131, 17 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 93, 107 (2002) (showing positions motivated by interests
implicated by projected costs and potential competitive harm).
206 See Sally M. Schultz & Joan Hollister, Lobbying FASB on Accounting for Investments, 19
J. Applied Bus. Res. 85, 88–92 (2003) (showing the effect of the notice and comment
process on SFAS No. 115).
207 See Paul R. Brown, A Descriptive Analysis of Select Input Bases of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 19 J. Acct. Res. 232, 233–45 (1981) (evaluating the relationship between
FASB decisions and constituent lobbying and yielding negative results, supporting the
hypothesis that the FASB does not consistently position itself with any one external constituent).
208 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 61 (concluding that structural factors, particularly mutual resistance, constrain the competing constituents from dominating the FASB).
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D. Summary
Although the FASB’s structure has been modiªed to assure more
public responsiveness, there has been no break with the classical independence model.209 Indeed, compared to the SEC, the FASB arguably remains the more independent agency. The political branches
of the federal government state the mission and select the members
of the SEC. With the FASB, on the other hand, the political branches
only wield veto power—they can put it out of business or they (or
their SEC nominees) can selectively reject its output, but they otherwise do not control it.210 The FASB emerges in a position similar to
that of many public agencies: regulating within the parameters of
stated goals, remaining subject to loose oversight from political
higher-ups, and taking private preferences into account without permitting them to determine results.211
We have seen the FASB maintain apparent independence, deºect
a pluralist challenge to its legitimacy, survive, and prosper. It has done
all of this against a background of constant complaint. Critics have
accused the FASB of excessive delay, excessive complexity, and excessive reliance on rules throughout its history.212 The question as to the
FASB’s legitimacy accordingly remains to be answered.
II. Decision Usefulness
This Part focuses on the Conceptual Framework’s designation of
the users as the interest to be served, a choice that had as much to do
with the creation of a viable agency framework as with the articulation
of a coherent accounting theory.213 For the New Deal model to work,
the FASB needed a focused goal.214 To get one, it broke with past accounting theory to raise external transparency— “decision usefulness”
for the users—over internal control as the system’s goal.215
This has had three consequences. The ªrst is substantive legitimacy, discussed in Section A.216 The user tilt makes plausible the
FASB’s claim to legitimacy as an independent expert. The goal of deci209 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9, 86–87; Mundstock, supra note 29, at 818.
210 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9, 14.
211 See Freeman, supra note 5, at 560.
212 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61.
213 See FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, § 34.
214 See Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51.
215 See infra notes 225–249 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 219–265 and accompanying text.
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sion usefulness is generally accepted as a policy matter and makes sense
as a matter of economic theory. It aligns the FASB with information
economics, which affords the most cogent justiªcation for a centralized, mandated standard setting for ªnancial reports. Section B addresses the second consequence: with decision usefulness, the Conceptual Framework embeds a normative preference for one of the FASB’s
leading private constituents, users and markets, over the other, preparers and managers.217 Although this caused constant and costly political
problems, it also yielded ancillary beneªts. User support, or at least acquiescence, counterbalances management opposition. At the same
time, no one can accuse the FASB of being a corporate tool. It instead
amounts to a subagent of its public agency government overseer, the
SEC. Section C takes up this agency relationship.218 The SEC’s delegation of standard-setting authority to the FASB for the most part has
served its own public purposes in a cost-effective manner.
A. The Conceptual Framework, Decision Usefulness, and Policy Legitimacy
The Conceptual Framework is widely regarded as a theoretical
failure, particularly with respect to the critical topic of revenue recognition and measurement.219 It did not silence critics who contend that
standard setting for ªnancial reports implies a political choice between competing constituent interests.220 Nor did it succeed in determining the results of standard-setting exercises.221 Actors at the
FASB defend it with faint praise as a useful exercise in philosophical
discipline222 or a “relatively consistent body of standards” to which the
FASB “pay[s] attention.”223 And, to the extent that the Conceptual
Framework’s precepts actually have shaped the FASB’s standards, critics charge that they skew results toward formalism and artiªciality and
sacriªce ºexibility and responsiveness.224

217 See infra notes 266–296 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 297–318 and accompanying text.
219 See Zeff, supra note 52, at 60.
220 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 10–11; Joshua Ronen & George Sorter, Reºections on
“Reºections on FASB’s Conceptual Framework for Accounting and on Auditing,” 4 J.
Acct. Auditing & Fin. 67, 69 (1989).
221 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 80.
222 Id.
223 Beresford, supra note 11, at 61.
224 See Homer Kripke, Reºections on the FASB’s Conceptual Framework for Accounting and on
Auditing, 4 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 3, 49–50 (1989).
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1. Decision Usefulness
Some assert that the Conceptual Framework accomplished one
important thing,225 set out in a single unprepossessing sentence in
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: “Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential
investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment,
credit, and similar decisions.”226 This concept, known as “decision usefulness,” seems like an obvious point, but it was controversial when
promulgated in 1978.227 Only thirty-seven percent of the comments
received on the point were favorable, and sixty-one percent of the
comments came from preparers.228
The objecting preparers had their reasons for opposing the provision in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1.229 Financial reporting in fact serves two purposes: it provides external transparency and serves as a part of a rational system of internal management.230 Historically, both purposes had been bound together under
the rubric of “stewardship,”231 which emphasized the manager’s duty
to maintain the value of assets in addition to its duty to report results
to owners and creditors.232 The value-maintaining preparer was seen
as a user and accorded an equal place at the table with owners and
creditors.233 Indeed, management asserted that stewardship implied
its own primacy, positing a community of interest between itself and
the ªrm's long-term shareholders as against an outside ªnancial market made up of speculators looking to turn quick proªts.234
The Conceptual Framework, even as it paid lip service to the
stewardship concept,235 broke with history by removing management
from the group of recognized users.236 Although the Conceptual
Framework asserted that the “role of ªnancial reporting requires it to
225 John C. Burton, A Commentary on the Reºections of Homer Kripke, 4 J. Acct. Auditing
& Fin. 79, 80 (1989).
226 FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, § 34.
227 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 20.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 158, at 296–97.
231 See id. at 296.
232 Id. at 295–97.
233 See id. at 296.
234 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 21.
235 FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, §§ 50–53.
236 Id. § 27; see also id. § 32 (asserting that standards that satisfy the objective of usefulness to investors should be “useful to all who are interested in an enterprise’s future capacity to pay”).
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provide evenhanded, neutral, or unbiased information,” neutrality
concerned only the usefulness of information reported.237 It had no
bearing on the relative treatment of constituent interests in the standard-setting process.238 This posture, taken together with the Conceptual Framework’s objectives of comparability across different preparers’ reports and consistency across time within a preparer’s reports,
implied signiªcant constraints on management’s discretion to choose
treatments (whether in view of a congenial bottom-line result or as
the result of an internal cost-beneªt analysis).239 Based on decision
usefulness, management would bear the burden of proof in justifying
its favored treatments in FASB proceedings.240
For the FASB, decision usefulness meant more than a normative
choice between the markets and the preparers. It completed the project of adopting the independent expertise model and foreclosing the
pluralist alternative. Recall that the expertise model only works if the
agency pursues an overriding goal.241 If the goal remains contestable,
the agency ends up with the political task of accommodating conºicting interests as it pursues multiple goals.242 Decision usefulness, left
within the stewardship framework, would have cast the FASB into a
world of multiple users with varied and conºicting preferences.243
The FASB’s interest in maintaining its own independence foreclosed
the possibility of a neutral approach to constituent interests.244
Unsurprisingly, the FASB has adhered to decision usefulness over
time. Its actors believe that so doing keeps them above politics.245 In
their view, the FASB exists to produce consistent standards with a conceptual underpinning.246 To take away the underpinning and open
the ºoor to all legitimate concerns would pull it away from its mission.247 So far as the FASB is concerned, such an open-ended process
would be better undertaken by a public agency.248
237 See id. § 33.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 70, 77; see also King & Waymire, supra note 29,
at 591 (stressing the importance to the market of consistent treatment and consequent
constraints on management discretion).
241 See Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51.
242 Stewart, supra note 104, at 1702.
243 See Lev, supra note 157, at 2, 13.
244 See id.
245 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61.
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 Id. at 57.
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Note that the FASB can proceed above politics and hew to the independent expert model only because it made a political decision ex
ante in its own Conceptual Framework. Unsurprisingly, staying above
politics pursuant to a political strategy has meant endless political problems, as the succeeding Sections show.249 At the same time, the institutional beneªts to the FASB have far exceeded the political costs.
2. Policy Legitimacy
The Conceptual Framework’s embedding of decision usefulness
as the standard-setting goal, however useful as a matter of agency design, would have availed the FASB nothing had it not also imported
policy legitimacy. Fortunately for the FASB, it has done exactly that.
The preparers had more than historical precedent (and their
own self-interest) going for them in advocating the goal of stewardship. They also had a powerful economic argument, which put a costbeneªt gloss on the pluralist, interest-balancing view of accounting
standard setting.250 The argument stresses the costs of disclosure.251
These include not only out-of-pocket compliance costs, but the potential for competitive disadvantage to the preparer and a wider discouragement of innovation and risk taking.252 As to a particular proposed
standard, the more current the information reported, the more detailed the report, the more focused on the proªtability of a narrow
proªt line, and the smaller the number of outside interests ªnding
the disclosure useful, the greater the likelihood that the disclosure
implies competitive disadvantage and would fail to pass cost-beneªt
scrutiny.253 Public values also come into play: because the requisite
cost-beneªt judgments would necessarily be subjective, the legitimate
standard setter would have to arrive at a “fair and equitable” balancing of interests.254 In this way, the preparers rolled together stewardship, pluralism, managerialism, and public welfare in a tidy package.
Based on decision usefulness, a two-part reply could be made for
the FASB. First, information is a public good that will be underpro249 See infra notes 266–296 and accompanying text.
250 See R.K. Mautz & William G. May, Financial Disclosure in a Competitive
Economy: Considerations in Establishing Financial Accounting Standards 1–4
(1978) (presenting a project of the Financial Executives Research Foundation).
251 See id. at 1.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 4. It was argued that the FASB should detail the costs and beneªts of each
standard in an “economic impact statement.” Id. at 7.
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vided absent regulation.255 More particularly, the standards reduce
the social costs of information asymmetries, which include high transaction costs and thin capital markets with low liquidity.256 Although
the capital markets certainly could function with low information,
they would not be robust.257 With different investors having access to
different levels of information, the fact that information shows increasing returns to scale implies that some investors would be endowed with monopolistic returns and other, less well-endowed investors would withdraw from the market.258 Bid-ask spreads would widen,
transaction costs would rise, and volume would drop.259 The userbased regime, in short, enhances allocative efªciency.260
Second, absent a centralized standard setter producing userdirected and mandated GAAP, reporting would suffer from the structural imbalances that otherwise impair the corporate governance system.261 We have, after all, a situation of separated ownership and control. The users, as dispersed shareholders, have no incentive to produce standards.262 Indeed, absent centralized standards, a free rider
problem would inhibit innovation by preparers and auditors and lead
to underinvestment in standards.263 Finally, if the development of
treatments were remitted to the joint discretion of preparers and
auditors, management would have an advantage in getting rule innovations to suit its interests, causing information asymmetries.264
Taken together, the two justiªcations replicate those supporting
the federal mandatory disclosure system. The FASB could not ask for
a better defense than that,265 and could not have gotten by with anything less. Note that at the same time the preparers’ cost-beneªt argument is countered without being confronted.

255 The Conceptual Framework takes care to note this. See FASB, SFAC No. 2, supra
note 103, § 135.
256 Lev, supra note 157, at 9.
257 See id. at 8–9.
258 Id. at 6–7.
259 Id. at 8.
260 See id. at 4–9.
261 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 594–96.
262 Id. at 595.
263 Id.
264 See id. at 594–95.
265 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61 (pointing out that the United States has the
world’s ªnest ªnancial system).
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B. Management Opposition
Even as the FASB emerged as a plausible imitation of an expertise-based, independent public agency, it differed in one signiªcant
way. With a public agency, the elected legislature states the goal, importing political as well as policy legitimacy at the outset.266 With the
FASB, the founders delegated the goal-setting function to the agency
itself.267 The FASB then set the goal with a view to its own institutional
viability, while traversing the interests of a primary constituent.268 Unsurprisingly, the preparers dissented and the goal failed to attain a
general consensus.269 Dissent ripened into opposition when the FASB
proceeded to take seriously its own independence and set an aggressive agenda of standards reform.270 The preparers had signed on during the 1970s, when the political environment made public standard
setting by actors hostile to corporate interests a cognizable possibility.271 That threat receded after 1980, and with it management’s disposition to cooperate with the FASB.272
The FASB made enemies in boardrooms with a trio of initiatives
in the 1970s. First, it changed the rules on the recognition of loss contingencies to block accruals before such time as the loss reasonably
could be estimated.273 This inhibited management’s elbow room to
indulge in the time-honored practice of smoothing income across accounting periods.274 Second, taking a fair value point of view that was
itself anathema to management, the FASB tightened the rules on
portfolio securities and troubled loans, forcing the banks to take
write-downs during a recessionary period.275 Third, the FASB went
after the oil and gas industry, which had been happily capitalizing and

266 See Landis, supra note 32, at 50–51.
267 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 77.
268 See id.
269 Id. at 75–76, 78.
270 See id. at 119.
271 See id. at 9–10. The American Management Association had argued for a uniform
standard setter as early as 1932. Id. at 5. But in the hot stock market of the 1960s, managers
became more appreciative of the beneªts of ºexible accounting. Zeff, supra note 52, at 58.
272 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 70, 119.
273 See generally Accounting for Contingencies, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/
fas5.pdf.
274 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 31.
275 See generally Accounting for Certain Marketable Sec., Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.
fasb.org/pdf/fas12.pdf.
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amortizing all drilling costs.276 The FASB wanted immediate and full
cost write-offs.277 The industry argued that this would chill investment
in exploration and applied political pressure that eventually resulted
in an SEC limitation on the treatment’s application.278
The FASB continued to anger corporate boards in the 1980s,
when it addressed corporate obligations to retired employees under
deªned beneªt pension plans.279 The FASB wanted these booked as
balance sheet liabilities.280 The preparers resisted successfully, arguing
that such a treatment would mean the end of employee pension beneªts.281
In the 1990s and 2000s, management stock options became the
next hot button issue when the FASB proposed that the options’ economic cost to the shareholders be assessed at fair value on the grant
date and expensed over the vesting period.282 The preparers, again
arguing that the reform would inhibit investment and innovation, resisted in Congress, procuring a Senate resolution grounded in their
pluralist, cost-beneªt view of ªnancial standard setting.283 The FASB,
said the Senate, should confront the economic consequences of its
proposed standards.284 A bill introduced contemporaneously would

276 See generally Fin. Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Cos.,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 19 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1977),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas19.pdf.
277 See generally id.; see also generally Suspension of Certain Accounting Requirements for Oil and Gas Producing Cos. (An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 19),
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 25 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas25.pdf.
278 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 67–70; Robert T. Sprouse, Discussion of the SEC’s Inºuence on Accounting Standards: The Power of the Veto, 19 J. Acct. Res. 165, 167 (1981) (explaining that the SEC’s intervention was not technically a veto). The SEC cited national
policy concerns respecting the measurement of proven and probable reserves. See Adoption of Requirements for Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices for Oil and Gas
Producing Activities, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5966, Public Utility Holding Company
Act Release No. 34-15108, Investment Company Act Release No. 35-20688, 15 SEC Docket
929 (Aug. 31, 1978).
279 See generally Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 87 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985) [hereinafter FASB, SFAS No. 87],
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas87.pdf; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 118.
280 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 118. The FASB settled for a modiªcation of the existing system. See generally FASB, SFAS No. 87, supra note 279.
281 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 118–22.
282 See id. at 155.
283 See Michael H. Granof & Stephen A. Zeff, Unaccountable in Washington, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 23, 2002, at A19.
284 See id.
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have conditioned the effectiveness of new standards on an SEC majority vote.285 The FASB backed down and shelved the project.286
The FASB, setting its agenda independently in this way, has pursued decision usefulness in disregard of constituent opposition. The
preparers view this as a betrayal, a classic case of an unresponsive
agency promulgating regulations for their own sake.287 Neither the
FASB notice and comment process nor the FASAC advisory process
has proved tractable for the preparers.288 They complain and get occasional concessions, but the FASB continues to promulgate standards
that they oppose.289 The preparers, however, do not argue for a public
standard setter.290 They instead want to contain the private agency
with an agenda control mechanism: an oversight board with power to
block agenda items and force revision of existing standards.291 They
have pressed for this at the FAF,292 at the SEC,293 and in Congress,294
making the pluralist case for public accountability without success.
Whether this implies a democratic deªcit is another question. The
preparers hardly lack inºuence or political access. They have wielded
their political muscle to block proposed standards, secured two of the
FASB’s seven seats, and, at least for a while, procured a supermajority
voting regime.295 Meanwhile, the FASB emerges from this four-decade
back-and-forth with an enviable reputation for independence.296
C. Public Oversight
The relationship between a public agency and a delegated private
standard setter has been usefully described in private contractual terms:
285 Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
286 See Granof & Zeff, supra note 283. The FASB famously returned to the matter in
2004, when the post-Enron political winds blew more favorably. See generally Share-Based
Payment (Revised 2004), Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf.
287 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 57 (citing complaints from John Reed, Chief Executive Ofªcer of Citibank).
288 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 99, 126; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61.
289 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 98, 118–31, 183.
290 See id. at 102; Beresford, supra note 11, at 59.
291 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 119–23, 140; Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
292 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 119–23 (describing the Business Roundtable’s Accounting Task Force); id. at 126–27 (describing the preparer’s argument for a return to
secrecy that would ease the path for back room logrolling).
293 Id. at 140 (recounting John Reed’s proposal to David Ruder).
294 Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
295 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 126, 150, 164.
296 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61.
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the public agency, like a ªrm, decides to “make or buy.”297 Buying
makes sense if the value of the resources conserved through reliance
on a private entity exceeds the relationship’s ancillary costs.298 The
costs mount if the delegate’s incentives work at cross purposes with the
agency’s pursuit of its public mission.299 If the delegate has an advantage of information and expertise and the agency’s monitoring resources are limited, then the agency can lose control of the outcome.300
The undermonitored delegate can hold up its public principal.301
If we ªll in the SEC as the principal and the FASB as the delegate,
the result provides an excellent example of a successful public-toprivate contract. Two factors explain the success. The ªrst stems from
the Conceptual Framework and decision usefulness. Together they
effectively align the FASB’s institutional goal with the SEC’s mission of
investor protection.302 Indeed, as between the two agencies, the FASB
now is the better-aligned of the two. Under the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, SEC rulemaking now labors under
the same marching orders that the preparers once sought for the
FASB: the SEC is required to take “efªciency, competition, and capital
formation” into account in addition to investor protection.303
The alignment, thus set in theory, works in practice because the
FASB’s appointments structure and rules of independence assure that
its members pursue its formal mission rather than constituent or personal interests. The alignment makes the SEC useful to the FASB, as
well as making the FASB useful to the SEC. To contain the FASB politically, the preparers must sustain the burden of an appeal to Congress,
as the SEC has proved an uncongenial lobbying alternative on repeated
occasions.304 The users, silently seconding the point, have remained
quiescent throughout the FASB’s turbulent political history.305
297 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389, 390
(2003).
298 See id. at 405.
299 Id.
300 See id.
301 Id. at 406, 410–11 (citing the SEC’s relationship with the FASB as an example).
302 See FSAB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, § 34; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 141.
303 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(b) (2000). For a case invalidating an SEC rule on this ground, see Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
304 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 140–46. John Reed, acting for a committee of preparers on the agenda control initiative, unsuccessfully attempted to inºuence both David
Ruder and Richard Breeden in succession. Id. A later SEC chair, Harvey Pitt, might have
been an exception, but was forced to resign before he got the chance.
305 See id. at 98.
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The second factor in the success of the public-to-private contract
between the SEC and the FASB is shared expertise.306 Although the
SEC values the resources (both economic and political)307 saved by
outsourcing the standard-setting function, it nonetheless makes a signiªcant ongoing internal investment in accounting expertise.308
Monitoring of the FASB’s agenda, priorities, and emerging positions
by the SEC Ofªce of the Chief Accountant occurs in the ordinary
course and proceeds cooperatively.309 The SEC’s accountants and the
FASB announced a policy of mutual nonsurprise in 1974, and have
since held to it.310 As in all effective principal-agent relationships, the
principal also wields a big stick.311 The FASB’s authority depends on
SEC certiªcation, and because the SEC maintains its own standardsetting capacity, it can overrule the FASB by taking a matter into its
own hands.312 It has done this rarely, however.313 The two most prominent cases, the oil and gas drilling expense matter314 and accounting
for inºation,315 occurred during the FASB’s early history, with constituent pressure coming to bear both times.316 The most recent case
of note, accounting for derivatives, involved an extended back-andforth on a complex matter, with the FASB proving responsive over
time.317 In the more usual case, threats and suggestions sufªce to
keep the two agencies’ agendas and priorities in synchrony.318
306 For a discussion of the SEC’s role as an accounting standard setter, see generally
Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 837 (2005).
307 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 834.
308 See Zeff, supra note 52, at 60–61, 63.
309 See id. at 60–61; see also SEC, Ofªce of the Chief Accountant, http://www.sec.gov/
about/ofªces/oca/ocaaccount.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (listing selected Staff Bulletins issued by the Ofªce).
310 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 26–27.
311 See Barrett, supra note 306, at 868.
312 See id.; Cunningham, supra note 31, at 323.
313 See Barrett, supra note 306, at 868.
314 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 69–70.
315 See Zeff, supra note 52, at 59. Incidences of overruling were more common with the
CAP and the APB. Id. at 58–59.
316 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 56–69; Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74. In the
inºation accounting case, the auditors weighed in against the FASB. See Hussein & Katz,
supra note 17, at 74.
317 The SEC intervened with its own disclosure requirements between the promulgation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 119 and Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 133. See Proposed Amendments to Require Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments, Exchange Act Release No. 33–7250,
Investment Company Act Release No. 34–36643, 60 SEC Docket 2575 (Dec. 28, 1995);
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm., SEC to Consider Requiring Disclosures About Deriva-
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D. Summary
The FASB and its founders sought to legitimate private standard
setting by adopting the New Deal model of the independent, expert
agency. Much like an independent public agency, they encountered a
range of pluralist, public interest objections to the FASB’s exercises of
regulatory discretion. But faithful adherence to the New Deal playbook worked well in the long run. This happened in no small measure because the FASB put itself on history’s winning side with decision
usefulness. It thereby aligned itself not only with the SEC, but also
with the broader economic shift away from managerialism and toward
capital market governance under the norm of shareholder value.
III. Rules and Principles
This Part addresses the standards themselves. We have seen that
the preparers’ lack of agenda control triggers the charge of “standards overload.”319 The preparers also complain of excessive complexity, but only when they dislike the substance of the treatment under
discussion.320 Complexity bothers them less when the substance is congenial.321 The complaint of excess complexity, as mooted more gen-

tives and Market Risk ( Jan. 28, 1997), available at 1997 WL 34093. See generally Accounting
for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 133 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1998), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas133.pdf; Disclosure About Derivative Fin. Instruments and Fair Value of
Fin. Instruments, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 119 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1994), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas119.pdf.
318 For theoretical treatments of the relationship, see Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki
Shibano, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board:
Regulation Through Veto-Based Delegation, 32 J. Acct. Res. 1, 2, 7–14 (1994) (setting out a
formal veto model showing that wider delegation by the SEC would enhance the effectiveness of the process); D. Paul Newman, The SEC’s Inºuence on Accounting Standards: The Power
of the Veto, 19 J. Acct. Res. 134, 143 (1981) (asserting that FASB voting rule changes increase the relative power of the SEC); Joshua Ronen, Discussion of the SEC’s Inºuence on
Accounting Standards: The Power of the Veto, 19 J. Acct. Res. 157, 158 (1981) (rejecting Newman’s conclusions).
319 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 137; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
320 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 110; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
321 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 110; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
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erally, collapses into a third complaint: excessive use of rules.322 Today, all sides call for “principles-based” standards.323
Rules-based standards seek to supply a clear answer to every possible situation, pursuing the objective with detailed statements, brightline tests, and multiple exceptions.324 Internal inconsistency often results.325 Comparability also suffers: reporting entities hewing to the
same strict standard appear comparable on the basis of their ªnancials when their arrangements in fact are dissimilar.326 Worse, say
GAAP’s critics, the rules lead to transaction structuring and other
strategic behavior that undermines the quality of ªnancial reporting.327 Financials that are manipulated in this way, although rule compliant, do not truly and fairly state the reporting company’s income
and ªnancial position.328
The latter complaint rang loudly in the wake of the Enron scandal. According to critics, rules-based treatments had been manipulated by users and auditors and had resulted in reporting misstatements.329 The rules had fostered a dysfunctional, check-the-box approach to compliance.330 Preparers and auditors applied the rules
mechanically and ignored the substance of the transactions being reported.331 The system had fostered a culture of noncompliance in
which regulated actors invested in schemes of rule evasion.332 A principles-based system, critics contended, would be less manipulable and
thus superior.333 Congress concurred in passing SOX, which instructed the SEC to study the accounting system to ascertain the extent to which it is principles-based and to report on the length of time

322 See Ofªce of the Chief Accountant, SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d)
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System § I.A (2003) [hereinafter SEC Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.
htm; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
323 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 192; Schipper, supra note 33, at 61.
324 SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
328 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C; Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
329 See Steve Liesman, SEC Accounting Cop’s Warning: Playing by Rules May Not Ward Off
Fraud Issues, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 2002, at C1.
330 See id.
331 See, e.g., The Lessons from Enron, supra note 39, at 9–10; Liesman, supra note 329.
332 See The Lessons from Enron, supra note 39, at 9–10; Liesman, supra note 329.
333 See The Lessons from Enron, supra note 39, at 10.
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needed to transition to a basis in principles.334 The resulting SEC
Study conªrms the relative superiority of principles-based over rulesbased accounting and, following the historical pattern, hands the job
of reconstructing GAAP back to the FASB.335
This Part enters a dissenting opinion. GAAP has indeed become
increasingly rules-based over time.336 This is not because general principles no longer inºuence particular standards—the Conceptual
Framework sets out general principles from which GAAP continues to
follow loosely—but because the FASB’s constituents register demands
for tailored treatments and the FASB often responds favorably.337 The
pattern suggests capture, but also can be described as pluralist responsiveness. Either way, the substantive case against rules-based
GAAP is not compelling.338 The FASB employs rules, despite their
shortcomings, because they constrain preparer discretion, facilitate
audits, and decrease the likelihood of scandals.339 These justiªcations
still carry persuasive weight.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages, Costs and Beneªts
This Section explores in the abstract whether GAAP should be
articulated in rules or principles. To avoid the difªcult problem of
clearly deªning the difference between the two, it ªrst describes the
dynamic that brings rules into existence.340
Assume that the standard setter has proposed a new principlesbased standard. The preparers then use the notice and comment process to seek particular exceptions from the general principles. One
means to this end is a “scope exception”: a rule that excludes stated
transactions or items from a more general treatment category.341
GAAP’s complex derivative rules provide a good example, with nine
334 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(d), 116 Stat. 745, 768–69
(codiªed at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Supp. III 2003)).
335 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § VI.
336 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 63.
337 See id. at 63, 66–67.
338 See infra notes 371–442 and accompanying text.
339 See infra notes 349–360 and accompanying text.
340 The meaning of generally phrased principles to some extent lies in the eye of the
beholder. See Mark Kohlbeck & Terry Warªeld, The Effects of Principles-Based Accounting
Standards on Accounting Quality 2 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=724237) (deªning principles-based accounting as emphasizing
asset and liability measurement, in particular fair value measurement, as opposed to earnings-based accounting).
341 Schipper, supra note 33, at 66–67.
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exceptions to the deªnition of derivative, several of which came into
the rules solely for the purpose of reducing preparation costs.342 Alternatively, preparers seek “treatment exceptions”: special rules for deªned items or industry practices.343 Revenue recognition rules that facilitate income smoothing provide a prominent example.344 Having
won their rule-based exceptions, the preparers (and their auditors)
then request detailed instructions respecting implementation.345 The
FASB responds, and GAAP becomes still more complex.
1. The Case for Rules: Cost Savings, Compliance, and Transparency
Rules-based accounting entails cost savings.346 The cost savings
follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards
govern homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex
ante instructions and have incentives to invest in compliance.347 Such
conditions tend to justify a rules-based approach.348 An across-theboard shift to principles would make sense only if the costs of constantly revising the rules to keep up with unintended applications due
to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage outweighed the beneªts of
advance speciªcation.349 GAAP does not appear to lie anywhere near
that level of dysfunction. Under this analysis, the indicated course of
reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules’
operation, periodically adjusting categories so that reporting results
follow from the rules’ operative principles.350
Compliance imports a second justiªcation for rules. Detailed rules
provide roadmaps both for GAAP compliance and the identiªcation of
noncompliance.351 The instructions provide a base of common assumptions and knowledge for both preparers and auditors.352 Differences in measurement decrease as a result.353 Noncompliance becomes
342 Id. at 66.
343 Id. at 66–67.
344 See id. at 67.
345 See id. at 66.
346 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 972 (1995).
347 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 570–
77 (1992).
348 See id. at 577.
349 See id.
350 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 346, at 995 (distinguishing underinclusion from overinclusion).
351 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
352 Id.
353 Id.
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more evident.354 And, as veriªcation becomes easier, the risk of audit
failure decreases.355 Indeed, given a rule, the auditor who discovers
noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let the matter pass.356 The
rule provides a justiªcation for the refusal, minimizing potential damage to the professional relationship between the auditor and the client.
Since the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it also increases the
ex post risk of SEC enforcement or civil liability respecting the preparer
and the auditor, further strengthening the auditor’s resolve.357
Transparency provides a third justiªcation. Detailed rules enhance transparency because their precise instructions narrow the
room for differences of judgment.358 To understand this connection
more clearly, revisit the legal realists’ case for principles over rules
with respect to private law adjudication.359 That case presupposes that
the law-to-fact application is explained and published in a judicial
opinion. The reported cases give the practitioner an expanding body
of fact-sensitive applications, ever better articulating the standard’s
meaning. Over time, the accumulated case law offers the practitioners
a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rule book, even as the
principle’s ºexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thus the
substance of the legal regime) are open for public inspection. The
ongoing rules-based articulation of GAAP by the FASB works similarly.360 But the application of open-ended accounting principles by
preparers and auditors does not. Financial statements and footnotes
are very summary documents. Decision making about treatments
happens in a black box, evolving as a matter of practice amongst insiders. There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting
the law-to-fact application, thereby diminishing the chance for outside
evaluation. The law-to-fact applications, meanwhile, are not made by
judges empowered by the state. They come from the preparers—the
regulated actors themselves—acting with input from the auditor’s
354 Id.
355 See id.
356 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
357 See id. at 68–69.
358 See id. at 67–68.
359 See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. Corp.
L. 737, 746 (2001).
360 According to the FASB, any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP stems from exactly this sort of law-to-fact development process, as rules are rewritten to take into account
different transactional facts and interpretive opinions accumulate. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to U.S. Standard Setting 3–4 (2002)
[hereinafter FASB, Principles Approach], available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/
principles-based_approach.pdf.
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professional review. And, when it comes to saying no, a professional,
even one historically conceived to be in an adversary posture to its
client, is in a materially different position from a judge.
2. The Case for Principles: Flexibility and Professional Judgment
The case for principles arises in large measure from the description of the perverse effects of rules. The critics admit the force of the
case for rules but assert that once rules come to dominate the accounting regime, cumulative perverse effects cause disadvantages to
outweigh advantages.361 The more detailed the set of exceptions, the
greater the chance that essentially similar transactions receive different accounting treatments.362 Scope and treatment exceptions build
inconsistencies into the standards, sacriªcing the integrity of the underlying principles.363 Strategic behavior results as preparers seek to
exploit the inconsistencies, designing compliant transactions that subvert the principles the rules supposedly effectuate.364 Meanwhile, proliferating exceptions fuel additional demand for explication from the
standard setter.365 The responsive standard setter ªnds itself attempting to articulate a treatment for every conceivable scenario.366 But the
attempt always fails, for the goal of a perfect, exhaustive rule book is
unattainable.367
At this point, the case for principles reverses the case for rules.
Since the standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situations ex ante, it is not clear why exhaustive instructions should be
held out as a goal in the ªrst place, given that micro-level standard
setting always results in inconsistencies.368 The only party with all information concerning a given transaction is the reporting company
itself. It follows that its internal preparers, operating in good faith, are
more likely to derive an appropriate treatment when applying a principle than is a rulemaking standard setter acting ex ante. With principles, company-speciªc knowledge and the regulatory framework in-

361 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C; Sunstein, supra note 346, at 969–96.
362 SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
363 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 66–67.
364 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
365 See id.; Schipper, supra note 33, at 67.
366 SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
367 Id.
368 See id.
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teract ºexibly, and the regulation’s purpose is more likely to be effectuated.369
3. Summary
These back-and-forth arguments hold out costs and beneªts on
both sides. Rules narrow discretion and prevent the appearance of
ªrst-best ªnancial reports. Principles widen discretion, creating a
danger of corruption.370 The answer to the question whether GAAP
should be articulated in rules or principles thus depends on the inquirer’s further assumptions. If we hypothesize that preparers care
only about ªdelity to accounting principles, and that audits proceed
in an ideal professional environment in which the auditor works unconstrained by pressures of time, price, and reputation, then the case
for a principles-based regime is strong. But a plausible case for rules
can be stated even under such conditions. This case strengthens materially if we assume that concerns about the bottom line shape preparer incentives along with an imperfect professional relationship between the auditor and the preparer client, an assumption widely held
in the present environment.
B. The Demand for Rules
Agents of the FASB vigorously defend rules-based GAAP.371 Donald Kirk, a founding member and one-time chair, once said that fair
presentation does not in the end mean fairness because preparers
always compete to ªnd advantageous ways to apply principles-based
standards.372 The FASB’s agents also repeatedly cite constituent demand.373 In the FASB’s view of the world, the same actor who argues
for principles one day turns around the next to demand detailed
“guidance” on a particular standard.374 And even as the FASB publicly
embraces principles in the wake of demands registered after the Enron scandal, it simultaneously cautions that it does not entirely control the shape its standards take.375 Rather, the standards are informed by reading comment letters, meeting with preparer represen369 Id. § I.D.
370 See Ayres & Braithewaite, supra note 4, at 56.
371 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 81.
372 Id. at 81–82.
373 See id. at 105.
374 Id.
375 See Smith, supra note 182, at 3–4.
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tatives, and talking with auditors.376 The FASB thus sees itself as a responsive regulator as it tends towards rules.
1. Auditors, Clients, and Plaintiffs
We have seen that preparers petition the FASB for scope and
treatment exceptions.377 But the rules mostly proliferate due to the petitions of auditors, which pull the standard setter into multitudinous
small issues.378 Client relations motivate this in part. Auditors dislike
saying no because audit clients resist naysaying. Absent a precise written
justiªcation, they balk at auditor objections to their treatments: “Show
me where it says I can’t do this.”379 The auditor therefore seeks the
backing of a precise negative instruction in GAAP before objecting.380
The rule insulates the auditor’s professional judgment from the client’s
negative response and ªxes blame on the external authority. Given a
rule, the auditor also can assure the client that competing ªrms will not
sign off on its ªnancials either.381
The audit profession’s fear of enforcement entanglement, in particular civil liability, strengthens the preference.382 With an openended principle, both the preparer and the auditor must make a judgment respecting a law-to-fact application.383 Risk-averse actors in this
posture will be wary of second-guessing by regulatory authorities and
plaintiff’s lawyers.384 The good faith with which they apply the principle will be unveriªable ex post. Principles, then, make it hard to minimize enforcement risk.

376 Id. at 3.
377 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 67.
378 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
379 SEC Report, supra note 322, § III.I.i.
380 See id.
381 See George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and
After Enron, 52 Emory L.J. 1325, 1335 (2003).
382 See id. at 1331; Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74; Mundstock, supra note 29, at
839. Note that the auditors’ position changed over time: prior to the early 1970s, the primary conºicts that impacted accounting standards were between the preparers and the
users, with the auditors acting as neutral go-betweens. Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74.
The mediative role ceased in the early 1970s due to growing worries about civil liability. Id.
Thereafter the auditors participated based on their own self-interest. Id.
383 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
384 See id.
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2. Secondary Capture
Rules often are said to evidence auditor rent seeking. If this is
true, then what the FASB describes as responsiveness to constituent
demands can be described as a species of capture.
The auditor rent extraction point follows from a public choice
description of perverse effects resulting from the enactment of the
federal securities laws. Before 1933, nothing required publicly traded
ªrms to undergo independent audits.385 Nor were there any formally
designated, generally accepted accounting principles, much less a
standard setter.386 The federal securities laws broke the pattern by requiring an independent audit for registered companies.387 This made
the large audit ªrms providers of a necessary professional service and
positioned them to collect rents.388 Complex, rules-based standards
aid and abet the rent seeking. Complexity by itself generates work.389
It also strengthens entry barriers: over time, fewer and fewer audit
ªrms possess the technical resources necessary for engagements with
large clients.390 Indeed, the number of such ªrms has fallen to four.391
Innovation, moreover, is choked off to the extent that it decreases
auditability and exposes the ªrms to legal risk.392
The account is persuasive as a structural matter: the auditors
have gatekeeping power and are not incented to demand ªrst-best
GAAP. But there are some qualiªcations. Audit ªrms engage in price
competition despite their diminishing numbers.393 The price of audit
services fell in the 1980s in the wake of the federal push for increased
competition in service provision by professionals.394 Audit quality fell

385 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 6.
386 See id. at 5.
387 Id. at 6.
388 See Benston, supra note 381, at 1329–31.
389 See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. Acct. Res. 227, 231 (1981);
see also Mundstock, supra note 29, at 817 (charging that the FASB’s standards justify high
fees in exchange for little work and low legal risk and that its innovations never impair the
rent ºow to auditors).
390 See Dale Buckmaster et al., Measuring Lobbying Inºuence Using the Financial Accounting
Standards Board Public Record, 20 J. Econ. & Soc. Measurement 331, 340 (1994).
391 Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing 18 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 03–17, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=413581.
392 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 831. Advocates of expanded fair value accounting
are particularly likely to make this claim.
393 See Sunder, supra note 391, at 18–20.
394 See id. at 20.
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with it.395 To see why, hypothesize the incentives of an audit partner
under pricing pressure. The audit process begins with an appraisal of
the client’s risk of compliance failure.396 The auditor’s professional
judgment concerning the scope of the testing conducted during the
course of the audit follows from this risk appraisal.397 The scope of the
testing in turn affects the audit fee—as the risk increases, more tests
are needed, more time must be spent, and the fee rises. In this scenario, “check-the-box” rules recommend themselves over principles in
a hard cash sense because they make companies easier to audit. They
enhance veriªability, causing differences in measurement to decrease
and making noncompliance more evident.398 The audit becomes
faster and more predictable, making it easier to state a price in advance and lock in a proªt on the engagement. Contrast this rulesbased approach with a regime of principles requiring the preparer to
make fact-sensitive applications of the standards. This necessitates a
more labor-intensive audit in which unexpected and time-consuming
problems are more likely to arise. In sum, price competition for professional services fuels the demand for rules.
At least one empirical study has examined the effects of audit
ªrm lobbying on the FASB’s decision-making process.399 The study
found that audit ªrms indeed comment on proposed rules from their
own perspectives rather than those of their clients.400 Moreover, the
FASB is more likely to change a rule in response to auditor, rather
than preparer, protest.401 This result disappears, however, when alternative methodologies are used.402 Nor does a statistical ªnding of responsiveness necessarily imply inºuence. The record may merely reºect the fact that preparers and auditors tend to comment on different aspects of the same standards.403 The preparers are more likely to
object to a standard’s very existence or general purposes, matters
high on the FASB’s substantive agenda; auditors comment on matters

395 Shyam Sunder, Minding Our Manners: Accounting as Social Norms 5 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 05–18, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=733743.
396 Herwitz & Barrett, supra note 25, at 202–03.
397 Id. at 204.
398 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
399 See John R. Haring, Jr., Accounting Rules and “The Accounting Establishment,” 52 J. Bus.
507, 515 (1979) (concluding that the FASB is not responsive to business interests).
400 Id. at 511, 515.
401 Id. at 512, 515.
402 Buckmaster et al., supra note 390, at 341–42.
403 See id. at 340.
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of technical implementation that are less likely to implicate strong
preferences among the members.404
3. Summary
Intense demand for rules can be expected to persist and rent
seeking by the audit profession ªgures into the demand. That said,
auditor rents do not necessarily ªgure into the FASB’s pattern of positive response. Rules can be justiªed independently on a principled
basis.
C. Rules and Scandals
The oft-voiced claim that rules-based GAAP caused recent accounting scandals is largely unfounded.405 This is not because GAAP
contains no manipulable rules; it does. Nor is this because the rules
have not been manipulated; they have been. Rather, it is because recent corporate scandals and high-proªle reporting failures for the
most part did not stem from rule manipulation.
Those who denounce GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a
number of subject matters. These core, rules-based regimes include
accounting for derivatives and hedging activity, leasing, real estate
sales, stock-based compensation arrangements, consolidation (or
other recognition) of related entity ªnancial assets and liabilities, and,
prior to reforms instituted in 2002,406 mergers and acquisitions.407
The General Accounting Ofªce’s (the “GAO’s”) study of public company accounting restatements permits us to gauge the extent to which
these rules-based subjects ªgure into the spate of audit failures, accounting restatements being the results of audit failures.408 The study
shows that the annual number of restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to
225 in 2001.409 From January 1997 to June 2002, the total number of
404 Id. at 340–42.
405 See Benston, supra note 381, at 1344–45 (blaming the Enron scandal in part on the
fact that GAAP has become increasingly rules-based).
406 See generally Bus. Combinations, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 141
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas141.pdf
(ending pooling treatment for mergers).
407 SEC Report, supra note 322, §§ I.G, II.B.
408 See generally U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, GAO-03-138, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges (2002) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03138.pdf.
409 Id. at 14.
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restatements announced was 919.410 These involved 845 companies,
amounting to 10% of all of those listed on public exchanges in the
United States.411 Issues involving revenue recognition, whether in respect of misreported or nonreported revenue, made up the largest
group by subject matter category, accounting for almost 38% of the
919 restatements.412 The second largest group concerned cost- or expense-related issues, accounting for almost 16%.413 The GAAP revenue and cost recognition standards bearing on this 54% majority
group are for the most part principles-based—they are phrased in
general terms and require signiªcant exercises of judgment in their
application.414
The remaining restatements cover a range of subject matter,
some of it rules-based, but most of it principles-based. On the rulesbased side are restatements concerning merger and acquisition accounting and derivatives.415 Skewing toward the principles-based side
we ªnd restatements involving in-process research and development,
related party transactions, loan-loss reserves and loan write-offs, asset
impairment, inventory valuation, and restructuring activity.416
There is a simple reason why rules-based subject matters do not
dominate the list: rule compliance is more easily veriªed than principle compliance.417 As we have seen, detailed rules hold out roadmaps
both to GAAP compliance and to the identiªcation of GAAP noncompliance.418 Observers who disapprove of the rules-based treat-

410 Id.
411 Id. at 16 tbl.1.
412 Id. at 19.
413 GAO Report, supra note 408, at 20. This group consists of instances of improper
cost recognition, tax issues, and other cost-related improprieties that led to ªnancial misstatements. Id.
414 See Herwitz & Barrett, supra note 25, at 449–53. WorldCom is the most famous
recent case of the revenue and cost recognition principles’ opportunistic misuse. For description of this fraud, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 934–36 (2003).
415 See GAO Report, supra note 408, at 21 ªg.3, 22 tbl.2. Derivatives are a growth item
on the list of restatements. See id. at 23. Along with other securities-related restatements,
they increased from 4.6% of restatements in 2001 to 12.4% of restatements in the ªrst half
of 2002. Id. But the category is capacious, and includes errors and misstatements involving
derivatives, warrants, stock options, and other convertible securities. Id. Some of the standards in question are rules-based, while others are standards-based. Signiªcantly, most
involve fair value accounting.
416 Id. at 21 ªg.3, 22 tbl.2.
417 See supra notes 351–357 and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes 351–357 and accompanying text.

2007]

A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board

49

ments419 dislike the reporting destinations to which the roadmaps
lead. Since these destinations tend to be favored by the preparers,
their managers happily comply with the rules. At the same time, a
noncomplying preparer is more likely to confront an uncooperative
auditor.
There can be no denying that preparers often take advantage of
GAAP’s rule structures when they design aggressive treatments. Regulatory arbitrage (the practice of structuring an inappropriate transaction so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule) clearly is widespread. But these aggressive rule manipulations, which tend to involve
structured ªnance, leases, and (until recently) pooled mergers, do
not show up in large numbers on the list of recent restatements.
The audit failures and restatements follow less from regulatory
arbitrage than from strategic noncompliance—action taken based on
an interpretation of the law in conºict with the stated interpretation
of the regulator.420 Neither rules nor standards prevent such conduct,
and, as between the two, rules have the advantage in deterring it.421
Meanwhile, in every restatement case, GAAP by deªnition has proved
adequate to the job of identifying the misstatement and providing
corrective instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of SOX were
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to the
crisis, but wrong in ascribing the problem to the standard setter. This
is not for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits of
rules and principles in standard setting; it is a problem of compliance
and professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both.

419 See Mark W. Nelson et al., Where Do Companies Attempt Earnings Management,
and When Do Auditors Prevent It? 2 (Oct. 22, 2000) (working paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=248129) (showing that auditors pass on these treatments as
GAAP-compliant).
420 This was certainly the case with Enron. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark
Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275, 1305–09, 1314–1320 (2002). It is true that
misleading accounting treatments of transactions between Enron and off-balance-sheet
entities lie at the scandal’s core, and that the applicable accounting standards are rulesbased. See id. at 1305–09. Indeed, the form-over-substance treatments of these rules are as
notoriously arbitrary as any in GAAP. But, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the central problem at Enron lay not with the rules themselves, but with the company’s failure to
follow them. See id. at 1342. The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules’ structural
shortcomings, but from the corruption of Enron’s managers and perverse ªnancial incentives that inclined its auditor towards cooperation. Id. at 1305–09, 1314–20.
421 See supra notes 351–357 and accompanying text.
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D. The SEC Intervention
There is, then, no foundation for the proponents’ belief that
principles by themselves solve compliance problems. The recent history of audit failure has been no respecter of principles. The case for
principles accordingly returns us to the auditor-client relationship to
inquire into preparers’ incentives and the quality of auditors’ professional judgments. If recent history is predictive, the prognosis is not
good. The preparers have been guided by short-term solicitude for
their own stock prices rather than by ªdelity to accounting principles,
and the auditors have been disinclined to stop them. It will take more
than a new approach to standard setting to bring incentive compatibility to this context.
The SEC attempts to negotiate this problem in its report under
SOX by taking a split-the-difference approach that it calls “objectivesoriented.”422 As an exemplar, it offers the FASB’s recent revision of
the standard for mergers.423 Here is the SEC’s description of a principles-based system:
[T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard involves
a concise statement of substantive accounting principle
where the accounting objective has been incorporated as an
integral part of the standard and where few, if any, exceptions or internal inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further, such a standard should provide an appropriate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of
the class of transactions or events and should be devoid of
bright-line tests. Finally, such a standard should be consistent
with, and derive from, a coherent conceptual framework of
ªnancial reporting.424
This takes a step back from the base case for principles. The principles-based approach relies on the preparer to make a good faith application of the open standard to particular facts and assumes that a
successful system depends on exercises of professional judgment by
422 SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C. For additional comments on the SEC intervention, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Interpreting the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based” Systems in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with author). In Cunningham’s view, the SEC’s “objectives-oriented” standards are nothing more than GAAP’s prevailing mix of rules and standards. Id.
(manuscript at 52–57).
423 SEC Report, supra note 322, §§ I.C, I.E.
424 Id. § I.C.
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auditors and preparers who are motivated by ªdelity to the goal of fair
representation.425 The SEC removes this stress on the regulated actors’ responsibility for law-to-fact determinations by endorsing the legitimacy of constituent demands for speciªcity.426 It then shifts a burden of speciªcity back to the standard setter to provide “an appropriate amount of implementation guidance.”427 Bald statements of
principles, says the SEC, provide preparers and auditors insufªcient
structure in which to frame their professional judgment.428 The “principles” need to be “deªned speciªcally.”429
The SEC does not entirely abandon the objectives of principlesbased standards, however.430 Its projected regime appears to hold out
the beneªt of a decrease in the level of reporting detail.431 At the
same time, comparability of treatment across different issuers would
be enhanced through the avoidance of scope and treatment exceptions.432 But the decrease in complexity implies a concomitant loss of
transparency, since commonality of treatment obscures particulars in
the economics of differing underlying transactions.433 Relevance, reliability, and comparability become matters to be traded off by the
standard setter in a balancing exercise.434 At the bottom line, says the
SEC, economic substance should drive the development and scope of
the standards.435
Although this sounds plausible, a question must be asked: How
does the regime envisaged simultaneously articulate precise instructions and eschew all exceptions from its categories? So doing would
amount to a considerable achievement. The drawing of lines is intrinsic to regulation. Line drawing is what case law under principles is
supposed to do. It is not at all clear that ªnancial reporting standards
425 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 61; see also Accounting Reform and Investor Protection:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 148–49 (2002)
(prepared statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International Accounting Standards
Board) (describing the European system); Mundstock, supra note 29, at 844 (suggesting
that principles-based standards will be favored by preparers).
426 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 See id. § IV.D.
431 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § IV.D.
432 See id. §§ I.C, IV.D.
433 The comments in the text draw on FASB, Principles Approach, supra note 360, at
7.
434 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § III.C.
435 Id.
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differ from any other body of regulation in this regard. So, to the extent that the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all standards
mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disappointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any
other regulatory context.436
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards
that incorporate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the
rubric of principles-based accounting. The system envisioned more
accurately would be characterized as one of tough, general rules.437
Such a regime would have advantages. For example, it presumably
would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments tolerated in recent years, particularly those facilitating income smoothing. But if this
is what the SEC has in mind, another question arises: In the present
political and institutional context, how likely is it that the preparers,
their auditors, and their friends in Washington would permit the
FASB to use the rubric of principles-based accounting to usher in a
new era of strict treatments? Looking at the four-decade history surveyed above, the answer must be: very unlikely.
As a practical matter, then, if the SEC is serious about this move
to principles, then preparer and auditor judgments will matter more
in the future. The SEC acknowledges this when it warns that principles-based accounting implicates a more expensive, time-consuming
audit process.438 It anticipates that, in order to review preparer judgments, audit ªrms will have to hire expensive personnel with expertise in complex transactions.439 It also anticipates that the system will
require active audit committee oversight and other strong enforcement agents.440 Finally, it advises auditors and preparers to generate
extensive paper records respecting treatment decisions, so as to position themselves to defend their good faith.441 We get principles, then,
but no reliance on those applying them.
At the bottom line, the SEC is asking the users to trust that the
creation of the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

436 See FASB, Principles Approach, supra note 360, at 6.
437 The FASB’s 2002 proposal in effect warns audit ªrms and issuers of this when it
points out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earnings ªgures. See id. at
7–8.
438 See SEC Report, supra note 322, §§ I.C, I.I, V.H.
439 See id. § I.I.
440 Id. § III.J.
441 Id.
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(the “PCAOB”)442 effects a shift to a robust compliance regime. The
question is whether this better, more principles-based world can be
realized without unintended negative effects due to poor professional
judgment.
E. Summary
The public-private distinction helps to explain the connection
between the standards’ form and the audit process. The FASB, by conjoining agency independence and substantive alignment with the user
interest, traverses the interests of a key constituent: corporate management. This has a negative consequence. For the self-regulatory reporting system to work well, management must internalize the spirit
of the standards and cooperate fully with the audit ªrms. It has done
neither, and the standards’ form has been skewed as a result. No one,
however, suggests the corrective of reconstituting the standard setter
along pluralist lines. We have instead chosen to regulate the auditors.
The PCAOB has the job of ameliorating the cooperation problem by
forcing the audit ªrms to reject aggressive preparer treatments. If the
PCAOB succeeds at this, then, and only then, will the FASB be free to
move toward principles.
Conclusion
The FASB’s variant on the New Deal agency model remains robust. Privately constituted, but now publicly funded, the FASB is more
independent than ever. It may be second best, but nobody seems able
to suggest something better. Public interest advocates would remove
ªnancial standard setting to a government agency. That would succeed in getting a new hearing for substantive views that have not
found favor at the FASB. But it is by no means clear that better standards would result. Public choice theorists propose the more radical
alternative of deregulating GAAP by leaving the development of standards to preparers and auditors operating in spontaneous order. But
turning back the clock to 1929 presents signiªcant risks and therefore
has little practical appeal.
442 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(c) (Supp. III 2003). Under
SOX, the PCAOB is not a U.S. government agency, but a private organization with a governmental mandate. Id. § 101(b). For the view that the PCAOB should be considered a
U.S. government agency for due process purposes, see generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 975 (2005).
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